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Abstract 
Our study theorizes and tests why organizations engage in more external transparency 
as an open strategy practice and the share-price related outcomes associated with 
these practices. Drawing from literature on information asymmetry, we suggest that 
organizations that depart from their existing strategy or deviate from industry norms 
are more likely to open up their strategy in order to escape negative evaluations by 
analysts and scrutiny by investors. We further investigate how the stock market 
responds to more openness in strategy. In a dataset comprising of a sample of 472 
M&A deals and 886 associated corporate voluntary communications over a five-year 
period, we find that the likelihood of organizations engaging in open strategy 
practices that contribute to external transparency is associated with the degree to 
which an organization’s strategy differs from industry norms, but is not associated 
with how much it varies from its existing one. Regarding organizational outcomes of 
increased openness in strategy, we illustrate that increasing the transparency of M&A 
strategy to investors through voluntary communications can bring share-price related 
benefits. Our research contributes to literature on open strategy, information 
asymmetry, and managing M&A.  
Key words: Open strategy; M&A; information asymmetry; strategic variation 
and deviation; voluntary M&A announcements 
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Introduction 
A recent movement within strategic management has begun to advance ‘open 
strategy’ as an umbrella concept that envelopes open innovation and other open forms 
of strategy making (Whittington, Cailluet, and Yakis-Douglas, 2011). Whittington et 
al. (2011) describe open strategy as “a concept involving a bundle of practices, the 
mix varying across contexts” (p.535). The opening of strategy is the result of 
organizations’ movement towards widening inclusion and increasing transparency 
both inside and outside the boundaries of organizations (Whittington et al., 2011). 
While existing research provides examples of what these bundles of practice are (i.e. 
blogging, jamming, strategy presentations, crowd-sourcing), it only infers the value 
openness brings to an organisation in terms of widening the search for strategy ideas, 
sharing knowledge and engaging in strategic conversation. With the exception of a 
few recent publications (see for example, Whittington et al., 2015), there is a lack of 
research that provides empirical evidence of the reasons why organizations engage in 
open strategy or the organizational outcomes associated with these practices. We 
believe that understanding why organizations choose to open up their strategy and 
what happens when they do so furthers our understanding of this concept and helps us 
derive practice-related outcomes. We therefore focus on a specific form of open 
strategy practice in a highly critical strategic context: namely, external transparency 
during mergers and acquisitions (M&A). M&A are very widespread in the business 
world, accounting for more activity in dollar terms than many of the world’s largest 
economies1. For organisations, M&A can mean life or death (Angwin, 2007).  
There are several reasons why external transparency can play a critical role 
                                                             
1 2014 M&A global activity at $3.5 trillion exceeded the GDP of France ($2.9trl - the 5th largest 
economy in the world)  
 
 3 
during M&A. The strategic direction of an organization comes under intense scrutiny 
from outside constituents (Gilson, 2000). For instance, stakeholders may possess 
many concerns for the future of the protagonists and it is well reported in the financial 
literature that information about impending M&A can move financial markets (see 
Sudarsanam, 2010 for a review). Apart from the deal premium, issues such as 
potential synergies between organizations entering the deal, integration issues, and 
restructuring plans may be specific investor concerns (Angwin, 2001). Also, given the 
lengthy time period that M&A can span, investors may be nervous about deal 
completion (Angwin, 2004; Angwin et al., 2015). External transparency during M&A 
can act as a mechanism to ease possible investor anxiety regarding the process and the 
outcome of the deal.  
Compared to the process and the timeline of the deal, of equal importance is 
the ability of analysts and investors to interpret and evaluate the M&A (Zenger, 
2013). Organizations which adopt ‘unique’ strategies have been shown to be 
penalized by negative market reactions (Feldman et al., 2014; Litov et al., 2012; 
Zenger, 2013). These negative market reactions may be explained by the existence of 
information asymmetry between managers of organizations and outside investors 
(Gilson, 2000). Specifically, investors’ lack of understanding of the value of an 
acquirer’s strategy (Feldman et al., 2014), narrow specializations by analysts 
(Zuckerman, 2004), and numerous cognitive limitations attached to covering 
diversified firms or firms with unique strategies (Feldman et al., 2014; Litov et al., 
2012) result in depressed share prices. 
Drawing from information asymmetry theory (Ambarish et al., 1987; Miller 
and Rock, 1985; Myers and Majluf, 1984), we put forward and test hypotheses 
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concerning the likelihood of organizations undertaking M&A engaging in open 
strategy, and the likely outcomes of such strategies. We suggest that a fundamental 
difference in the pattern of present and future resource deployments is likely to act as 
a reason for financial analysts to publish unfavorable earnings forecasts or not to 
cover the organization. Both of these scenarios are likely to lead to negative share 
price reactions and these negative reactions are likely to be heightened during 
acquisitions (Haleblian et al., 2009). Our hypotheses are therefore built on the premise 
that organizations are likely to be motivated by, and succeed in, offsetting existing or 
anticipated negative market reactions by opening their strategy externally. 
We therefore argue that organizations are more likely to be engaging in forms 
of open strategy during M&A to reduce information asymmetry. We also argue that 
due to information asymmetry and its negative consequences, organizations with 
strategies characterized by greater strategic variation and deviation are more likely to 
be externally transparent. They are likely to move away from being opaque in an 
attempt to alter negative portrayals of analysts or to fill the voids left by analysts that 
do not issue earnings estimates after an organization has announced a merger or 
acquisition.  
In order to study increased transparency as an open strategy practice in an 
M&A context we examine M&A announcements during the deal process. These 
announcements come in two types; ‘mandatory’ and ‘voluntary.’ There are many 
studies of ‘mandatory’ (those required by law) announcements (Andrade et al., 2001; 
Goergen and Renneboog, 2003) that are required when a deal is to be launched. In 
these studies a 25% increase in target company share price is not uncommon (Baker 
and Limmack, 2002; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003). However ‘voluntary’ 
announcements (those made when a company decides on its own volition to design 
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and release information) have received much less attention and those that occur post-
deal announcement, but before deal closure, have received no attention. These 
communications, which we term ‘voluntary M&A announcements’ and define as 
public, voluntary communications carried out by organizations involved in M&A are 
the subject of this paper. Separate from the initial M&A announcements, these 
disclosures take place after the initial deal announcement and before its closing. 
Authors of these announcements can be bidders, targets, or both parties. Between deal 
announcement and the closing date, an intended acquisition can be made or broken by 
share price adjustments as investors react to deal-specific information released during 
this post-announcement period. Therefore, during M&A, top management teams of 
firms that are undergoing strategic variation or deviation are likely to try to win 
support for their strategy through increased transparency directed at analysts and 
investors. By focusing on share price reactions tied to voluntary M&A 
announcements, we measure how external forms of open strategy can be employed by 
organizations to manage short-term market responses during M&A rather than the 
eventual economic returns of the deal itself (Oler et al., 2009). 
A shift towards external transparency and asymmetry reduction implies an 
active orientation to shaping investor perceptions. It offers a choice about both 
whether and how to communicate. External forms of open strategy in the M&A 
context are in line with what Rindova and Fombrun (1999) have termed 'strategic 
projections', the various kinds of statements about intended strategy (i.e. published in 
corporate press releases and annual reports). Open strategy, therefore, contributes to 
how audiences evaluate a firm and allocate the resources they control. Similar to 
strategic projections, practices associated with external forms of open strategy not 
only offer information about strategic investments, but also have additional symbolic 
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content in providing ready-made and desirable interpretations of strategic moves for 
key audiences (Whittington and Yakis-Douglas, 2012). Our research focus therefore 
is not on the compulsory, non-discretionary forms of communication required by law 
that involves strategy (i.e. mandatory M&A announcements) but rather on voluntary, 
discretionary communications of strategy (i.e. voluntary M&A announcements). 
Existing research suggests that these voluntary announcements have symbolic and 
reputational value for analysts and investors and that they are used widely by 
established organizations and entrepreneurs (Vaara and Monin, 2010; Zott and Huy, 
2007; Rindova et al., 2004). Our research takes this one step further to move beyond 
the symbolic value of voluntary corporate communications and assesses the market 
value associated with them.  
Our paper proceeds as follows: we first discuss open strategy in the context of 
M&A, emphasizing that increasing external transparency as an open strategy practice 
can help combat information asymmetry. We then build our hypotheses using 
literature on information asymmetry and construct predictions on the likelihood of, 
and outcomes associated with observing organizations with strategic variation and 
deviation carrying out voluntary M&A announcements. After our hypotheses, we 
present our data and methodology, followed by the results. The final section includes 
our discussion and conclusion in which we address possible outcomes of open 
strategy in practice as well as limitations of the study and directions for future 
research. 
Theory and hypotheses 
Our research focus is on the external transparency aspect of open strategy. More 
specifically, our research falls into one of the four broad principles of open strategy 
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identified by Whittington et al. (2011): namely, external transparency. Traditionally, 
strategy has been ‘secret’ – elitist and opaque. Keeping strategy undisclosed can be 
associated with numerous advantages such as avoiding imitation, protecting product, 
design, or market-related advantages, and to being able to exercise the element of 
surprise (Makadok and Barney, 2001). Indeed, managers may suffer from strategic 
disadvantages if they uncover all information about a particular strategy (Barney, 
1986). In many cases, organizations can benefit from their managers possessing more 
information about the value of asset bundles than market participants (Rumelt, 1984). 
While organizations may suffer from strategic disadvantages if their managers 
uncover all information about a particular strategy, asymmetry regarding strategy in 
certain situations can disadvantage firms (Zuckerman, 2004). Our context of M&A is 
one such instance where opacity can cause an announced deal to be tied to negative 
share price reactions or to ultimately fail. One well-publicized instance of M&A 
failure widely attributed to strategic opacity was the failed bid by the Deutsche Boerse 
AG for the London Stock Exchange in 2004 (Sudarsanam, 2010). Making the 
acquiring firm’s strategy transparent to investors can be important to managing share 
price reaction and/or enable deal completion. We expand upon these in the rest of this 
section. 
 There is plenty of evidence drawing attention to the high level of information 
asymmetry that exists between outside stakeholders and inside managers (Zajac, 
1990; Shen and Cannella, 2003; Zhang, 2008; Graffin et al., 2011). M&As are 
associated with information asymmetry because choices regarding the upcoming deal 
are typically opaque, and information about M&A choices is rarely shared (Gomes et 
al. 2012). M&A information is market sensitive and the process is characterised by 
secrecy (Reuer et al., 2012; Boeh, 2011).  
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Following earlier research (see for example, Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; 
Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997; Haynes and Hillman, 2010), we use the patterns of 
strategic resource allocation as an indicator of strategic persistence of firm strategies 
over time as well as conformity to industry norms. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990), 
building on Mintzberg’s (1978) definition of strategy as a pattern of managerial 
decisions, constructed a strategic resource allocation profile. Their measure consists 
of six dimensions that represent the firm’s strategic decision pattern over time. 
Carpenter (2000), and more recently Haynes and Hillman (2010) further develop 
these six measures to account for two aspects: 1) strategic variation, a change ‘in the 
pattern of a firm’s resource commitments over time, relative to its past pattern,’ and 
2) strategic deviation, a shift away from the ‘firm’s resource commitments from 
industry norms of competition’ (Carpenter, 2000: 1182; also in Haynes and Hillman, 
2010).  
It is widely accepted that managing third-party perceptions is an important task 
for both sides in a merger or acquisition; for instance Trautwein (1990) notes that 
“(M&A) need marketing just like products, and effectively addressing the public or 
regulatory institutions in (M&A) may be critical to its success” (p. 293). In the 
context of M&A, open strategy can act as a force that both increases and reduces 
information asymmetry (Angwin et al., 2014). Furthermore, communicating a shift in 
current strategy is likely to be important for managers because voluntary M&A 
announcements can help reassure the investors regarding the future plans associated 
with the upcoming M&A, help investors evaluate the organizations’ strategic prowess 
in handling issues such as intended integration, restructuring, reorganization, and 
allow investors to get hold of substantive new information such as employee retention 
intentions and promises. M&A processes often unfold in ways that prevent the 
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financial press, analysts, and investors from having full access to information 
surrounding the new deal (Angwin et al. 2015). Due to these information failures, 
shareholders who are already highly sensitive to organizational changes are likely to 
be facing evaluative uncertainty regarding the M&A deal (Gomes et al. 2013). We 
believe voluntary M&A announcements may help reduce evaluative uncertainty 
overall but they are likely to be most effective in situations where there is a high 
degree of strategic variation from existing strategy or deviation from industry norms.  
We suggest that while M&A is a context associated with high information 
asymmetry, both strategic variation and strategic deviation are circumstances that add 
to the ambiguity of organizations’ future strategic direction. Organizational leaders 
that show high degrees of strategic variation from their existing strategy are more 
likely to engage in voluntary M&A announcements in an attempt to manage 
shareholders’ evaluative uncertainty. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 1a: The probability of observing voluntary M&A announcements is 
higher for organizations that display greater strategic variation compared to 
organizations that display lower strategic variation. 
 
Similarly, strategic deviation from other organizations within the industry is 
likely to discourage analysts from issuing positive earnings announcements or 
optimistic purchasing advice. As visible and high-reputation third parties, analysts 
play a significant part in how outside stakeholders evaluate strategic decisions such as 
M&A deals by providing these stakeholders with independent assessments (Fogarty 
and Rogers, 2005; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004). However, they have narrow areas 
of expertise, mainly focused on a single or few industries or countries (Kadan et al, 
2012; Sonney, 2009; Fogarty and Rogers, 2005). This narrow expertise can mean that 
analysts will have difficulty translating organizational strategies that do not comply 
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with industry norms; their forecasts may not be unbiased (e.g. Trueman, 1994; Hong 
et al, 2000) Therefore, in an attempt to shield themselves from unfavorable forecasts, 
organizations that have M&A strategies that fall outside of industry norms are more 
likely to engage in open strategy. In a context associated with information asymmetry, 
these open strategy practices are in turn likely to result in favorable stock market 
reactions. Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 1b: The probability of observing voluntary M&A announcements is 
higher for organizations that display greater strategic deviation compared to 
organizations that display lower strategic deviation. 
 
M&A announcements can both increase and reduce information asymmetry: 
Initial announcements of M&A are events that introduce information asymmetry to 
markets. However, voluntary disclosures following the initial announcements reduce 
information asymmetry. While in the case of the announcement of M&A there are 
share price penalties especially for highly diversified firms, there may also be 
unfavorable outcomes associated with voluntary M&A announcements. These may 
occur for organizations experiencing a shift from their ongoing strategies or strategies 
that deviate from those within the industry. In order to mitigate this effect, 
organizations need to convey credibility to their investors and analysts regarding their 
M&A plans, as failure to do so may result in negative share price reactions.  
Attempts at reducing information asymmetry may therefore be associated with 
negative investor reactions unless those organizations display competence and 
credibility towards their shareholders. Evaluating an organization’s strategy in the 
early stages of M&A is difficult not only because it involves attributing future 
organizational activities to possible performance outcomes (Haleblian and 
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Rajagopalan, 2006), but also because strategy involves qualitative judgments, which 
by their nature, are highly uncertain (i.e. they are characterized with having a lack of 
complete information and future unpredictability). According to Wade et al. (2006), 
when qualitative judgments need to be made under conditions of uncertainty, 
certification by credible and legitimate third parties is likely to become an influential 
decision criterion. Financial analysts are likely to act as third-party certification 
providers for outside stakeholders that serve to reduce the evaluative uncertainty 
associated with M&A. In the absence of ‘standards or yardstick against which (an 
organization) is judged’ (Graffin and Ward, 2010), analysts are likely to take into 
account the voluntary disclosures of organizations as sources of information. 
Analysts’ recommendations, further, are likely to reduce the uncertainty that outside 
constituents face in evaluating deals. Outside investors are likely to pay attention to 
analysts’ forecasts during M&A due to the important role these actors play as 
independent and credible information intermediaries (Wiersema and Zhang, 2013). 
Thus: 
Hypothesis 2a: Voluntary M&A announcements will be associated with above-
average cumulative abnormal returns for organizations that display greater 
strategic variation compared to organizations that display lower strategic 
variation. 
Hypothesis 2b: Voluntary M&A announcements will be associated with above-
average cumulative abnormal returns for organizations that display greater 
strategic deviation compared to organizations that display lower strategic 
variation. 
 
Methods 
Data  
 
Our dataset comprises of M&A deals involving U.S. target and U.S. bidder 
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organizations within the period 01/01/2005-31/12/2010. Because we are interested in 
the voluntary communications that take place after the announcement of M&A and 
before the closing of the deal, we eliminated all deals in which the announcement and 
the closing of the deal were simultaneous (there were 276 in total). We included deals 
that met the following criteria: (1) a deal value of $50 million or above; (2) the deals 
were completed by the end of our sample (31/12/2010); (3) the transaction is for a 
majority of shares of the target firm (above 50%); (4) we exclude hostile takeovers, 
leverage buyouts, spin-offs, recapitalizations, self-tender offers, exchange offers, 
repurchases, minority stake purchases, and privatizations; (5) we exclude financial 
organizations (SIC codes outside of 6000-6799); (6) both target and bidder 
organizations trade in NYSE or NASDAQ; (7) to asses a relationship between 
likelihood of disclosure and strategic variation and deviation, we follow McWilliams 
and Siegel (1997) to make sure our data is free of confounding events such as 
declarations of dividends, unexpected earnings or losses, major contract awards, new 
product announcements, and significant liability suits during a 21-day window (from 
day -10 to day +10) around voluntary M&A announcements. Our source for these 
events was StreetEvents. We collected deal-related data using MergerMarket 
regarding all relevant target and bidder data along with all related external 
communications associated with the deal. In total, there were 472 deals and 886 
external communications.  
Dependent variables 
 
 We carry out two regressions to investigate the drivers and consequences of 
open strategy. The first one is a logistic regression analysis where the dependent 
variable is the probability of observing a given organization carry out a voluntary 
M&A announcements. We carried out binary coding for voluntary M&A 
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announcements, coding ‘1’ for deals in which either of the parties (separately or 
jointly) carried out a voluntary disclosure regarding the deal. In this regression, our 
unit of analysis is ‘the deal’ rather than a given organization.  
 The second regression’s dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) (-1,+1) associated with voluntary M&A announcements. This dependent 
variable is designed to measure share price reactions associated with the voluntary 
disclosures and therefore our unit of analysis is the voluntary disclosure. The 
objective of our study is to analyse stock price responses to practices of open strategy 
through employing event study methodology (Brown and Warner, 1985; McWilliams 
and Siegel, 1997). In this study, we treat stock price responses as measures of 
voluntary M&A announcements impress investors in the short-term; given the long-
term and complex nature of M&A, we do not interpret stock price responses as 
necessarily effective measures of eventual economic returns (Oler et al., 2008).  
Thus we treat voluntary M&A announcements as events liable to generate 
abnormal returns in the financial market (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). We 
calculate CAR using a market model for each firm with an estimation window and 
calculate the deviation using expected returns and actual returns for every firm 
(source: Datastream). We use a NYSE and NASDAQ equally weighted index that 
indicates price trend movements based on a broad cross-section of the market. To 
estimate the market model, we use the 260 trading day prior to the event window as 
the estimation window (MacKinlay, 1997). The length of the period in our study is 
consistent with prior studies in the management literature (McWilliams and Siegel, 
1997). To calculate CAR, our main analysis uses a short event window of 3 days (t= -
1 to +1), measuring immediate investor impressions. Long windows may include 
confounding effects that lead to false inferences about the significance of an event 
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(McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). The -1 day allows for leakage of information prior to 
the presentation itself (Schijven and Hitt, 2012). For our model estimation, we used a 
static linear panel data model where CARit is the cumulative abnormal return for firm 
i for event t.  
 
Independent variables 
We calculate strategic variation as a measure of a departure from prior firm 
strategies as a result of a specific M&A deal and strategic deviation is a divergence 
from industry norms stemming from a specific M&A deal. These two continuous, 
multi-item measures were developed by Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) and 
modified by Carpenter (2000) and more recently employed by Haynes and Hillman 
(2010). To account for the influence of the specific M&A deal, we extend these 
metrics to include a before (deal announcement) and after (deal closure) dimension by 
calculating the differences for pre-deal strategic variation and strategic deviation and 
post-deal strategic variation and strategic deviation. In doing so, we calculate a 
continuous variable for strategic variation and deviation that takes into account a 
specific event (here, the M&A deal) rather than general metrics for deviation and 
variation for organizations in a given year. Prior to calculating the pre and post deal 
values, we follow Carpenter (2000) and Haynes and Hillman (2010) in using a 
composite measure of six allocation ratios. These are: (1) advertising intensity 
(advertising/sales); (2) R&D intensity (R&D/sales); (3) plant and equipment upgrades 
(new plant and equipment/gross plant and equipment); (4) nonproduction overhead 
(SG&A expense/sales); (5) inventory levels (inventory/sales); (6) and financial 
leverage (debt/equity). We collected data for these measures using COMPUSTAT. 
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Some data for calculating ratios was missing in COMPUSTAT due to lack of 
reporting. Thirty-two observations were dropped due to missing data.  
To measure strategic variation, we followed Carpenter (2000) and Haynes and 
Hillman (2010) in creating an index that uses a combination of exponential smoothing 
and Euclidean distance calculations. Different to the two mentioned works, however, 
our measures include a shorter time period (6 months instead of one year) and our 
focal year varied with each organization. For each deal, we calculated the actual 
resource allocation figures for bidder organizations and using exponential smoothing, 
calculated the baseline strategic variation for each bidder organization for t-4 to t (the 
year that the M&A deal took place). Earlier researchers who have employed the same 
method of metrication have suggested that a five-year window (t-4 through t) is 
sufficient to establish a variation pattern and narrow enough to exclude variations in 
the external environment. To account for major variations that may influence the 
environment, we control for the 2008 financial crisis. We then added all ratios that 
had gone through exponential smoothing in order to obtain a composite forecasted 
strategic variation for the duration of six months prior to the initial announcement of 
the deal and the 6-month period following the closure of the deal. We repeated this 
exponential smoothing for all years. To calculate the divergence of an organization’s 
actual resource allocation profile from the forecasted resource allocation profiles (of 
previous five years), we took the differences of the exponentially smoothed, 
forecasted amount and the actual resource allocation ratios. We took the absolute 
value of these differences and normalized them through taking the natural log. The 
resulting calculations were the divergence of firms’ actual resource allocation profiles 
from the forecasted ones. 
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Strategic deviation (departure from industry norms) was calculated similar to 
strategic variation, only this time we calculated the absolute value of industry norm 
and the firm’s actual resource allocation ratios. To establish industry ratios, we used 
the top four firms in each industry based on the C4 measure of industry concentration 
(Dobrev et al., 2002). Once again, we follow Carpenter (2000) and Haynes and 
Hillman (2010) in calculating these ratios, and normalized our variable by taking the 
natural log of the differences.  
 Our measures strategic variation and strategic deviation take into account the 
combined entity that comes into existence as a result of the deal.  
 
Control variables 
We introduced a variety of control variables for factors that were likely to 
impact on the likelihood of organizations to engage in open strategy and likely to 
have an influence market reactions. All of the control variables are used as proxies for 
contexts/events associated with a vacuum of information that would leave investors 
hungry for information. We therefore controlled for high-reputation intermediaries, 
which we believe may be instrumental in facilitating organizations to communicate. 
We used binary codes to distinguish organizations that employed legal advisors in the 
magic circle2, financial advisors in the bulge bracket3, and white shoe consultants4. To 
                                                             
2 Legal advisors in the magic circle for the UK: Allen & Ovary , Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 
Linklaters, Slaughter and May; For USA: Arnold & Porter; Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft; Cravath,  
Swaine & Moore; Covington & Burling; Davis Polk & Wardwell; Debevoise & Plimpton; Dewey & 
LeBoeuf; Hogan & Hartson; Latham & Watkins; Milbank, Tweed,  Hadley & McCloy; Ropes & Gray; 
Shearman & Sterling; Sidley Austin; Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett; Sullivan & Cromwell; White & 
Case; Willkie Farr & Gallagher; WilmerHale. 
 
3Financial advisors in the bulge bracket: Dillon, Read & Co.; Swiss Bank Corporation; UBS ; First 
Boston ; Credit Suisse ; Kuhn, Loeb & Co.; Lehman Brothers ; Merrill Lynch ; Bank of America ; 
Salomon Brothers ; Travelers Group ; Bank of America Merrill Lynch; Barclays Capital ; Citigroup ; 
Deutsche Bank ; Goldman Sachs ; JPMorgan Chase ; Morgan Stanley ; Lazard Freres & Co. ;  
Goldman, Sachs & Co. ; N M Rothschild & Sons 
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take into account any possible effects of the financial crisis, we coded 
communications after 24 October 2008 as ‘1’ for ‘after the crisis.’ We also suggest 
that likelihood of disclosure is higher for organizations subject to greater information 
failures, e.g. if the deal value is small relative to the acquirer, in turnover terms, then 
there may be less need for protagonists to communicate to the markets as the effect of 
the deal on the acquirer will be limited. We use the log-adjusted deal value for taking 
size-related information asymmetries into consideration. Also, following Zhang and 
Rajagopalan (2010), we controlled for prior firm performance by calculating the 
industry-adjusted ROA in the prior year. For poor prior firm performance we 
calculated 1/(prior firm performance). Data sources for deal size was MergerMarket 
and the source for prior firm performance was COMPUSTAT. We also tried to 
control for factors causing changes in the measures of bidder variation and deviation. 
These are: Acquisition volume for the past year, in the last three years, and in the past 
five years; acquisitions outside of the main SIC code for the past year, in the last three 
years, and in the past five years. Our source for these was MergerMarket. Also, to 
take into account time pressures which may be influential in motivating organizations 
to disclose, we included the following control variables: whether or not an acquisition 
was rumoured, and the time that passed between the initial announcement of the deal 
and the closing of the deal. Once again, our source was MergerMarket. Furthermore, 
we included a control variable for share price reactions to the initial announcement of 
the M&A deal that may be influential in organizations trying to restore or further 
enhance market reactions (i.e. cumulative abnormal returns associated with the initial 
announcement of the deal for a short window (-1,+1)). Similar to our other 
calculations involving share prices, our source of data was Datastream. In addition to 
                                                                                                                                                                              
4 White shoe consultants: Bain & Company; Boston Consulting Group; McKinsey & Company; A.T. 
Kearney; Booz & Company; Arthur D. Little;  Monitor Group 
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these, we included a control for whether or not the voluntary disclosures were 
associated with any changes in analysts’ opinions (i.e. difference between the average 
of analysts’ estimates following the initial M&A announcement and average of 
estimates following voluntary disclosures). Following Wiersema and Zhang (2013), 
we collected data regarding the first set of analysts’ estimates using the Institutional 
Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database. Analysts’ estimates in I/B/E/S uses a 
five-point recommendation scale with a recommendation of ‘1’ for ‘strong buy’ and 
‘5’ for ‘sell’. We adjust the measure for the number of analysts that provide coverage 
for the given firm. Finally, for each model, we included dummy variables for main 
industry and each year of our study period, and controlled for the order of the 
voluntary M&A announcements (i.e. whether it was the first announcement following 
the initial announcement of the deal, whether it was the second etc.).  
Statistical analysis 
Our statistical analysis is made up of two stages. First, we test the likelihood 
of organizations carrying out voluntary disclosures regarding M&A after the deal was 
announced, and before the deal was closed. Second, we carry out another regression 
with CAR associated with voluntary M&A announcements as our dependent variable. 
Our unit of analysis for our first regression is the deal and that of the second 
regression is the voluntary M&A announcement. 
Models 1a, 2a, 3a, and 4a test whether an organization is engaging in external 
forms of open strategy when it is undertaking and M&A deal that would be related to 
departure from its existing strategy or divergence from industry norms. We estimated 
the likelihood that an organization would engage in practices associated with open 
strategy using the following logistic regression model: 
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ln (
𝑃(𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡)
1−𝑃(𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡)
) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑡𝑟𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝑍𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖      (1) 
where i represented firm i, j represented deal j, and t represented time t. 𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 was the 
dependent variable, 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 was a matrix of controls, and 𝑍𝑡  to account for unobserved 
changes in M&A trends. 
We calculated abnormal returns, i.e. the difference between the expected 
returns and actual returns, using a market model for each firm5 with an estimation 
window. The model to capture CAR was: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 𝐸[𝜀𝑖𝑡] = 0  and  𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝜀𝑖𝑡] = 𝜎𝜀𝑖𝑡
2                (2) 
We used the NYSE and NSDQ equal-weighted index as the index of market 
portfolio which indicates the price trend movements based on a broad cross-section of 
the market. In order to calculate the expected return over the t= [-1, +1] event 
window, we used the coefficient found from the equation (2). 
Models 1b, 2b, 3b, and 4b are constructed in order to test whether stock price 
responses are associated with voluntary M&A announcements. We used the equation 
(3) to test this association.  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑡𝑟𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝑍𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖                  (3) 
For our estimation, we used a static linear panel data model where CARij is the 
cumulative abnormal return for firm i at event j. Because we use an event study 
methodology for our second regression, we follow McWilliams and Siegel (1997) by 
also screening out confounding events such as declarations of dividends, other 
mergers and acquisitions, earnings announcements, major contract awards, new 
product announcements, and significant liability suits during a 21-day window (from 
                                                             
5 Source: Datastream 
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day -10 to day +10) around the voluntary M&A announcements (source: Factiva). 82 
voluntary M&A announcements were excluded as a result.  
Before the estimation, we inspected the values of variance inflation factors 
(VIF) to assess our data for multicollinearity. The VIF values ranged between 1.22 
and 2.97 for the variables in our regression models, which is lower than the 
commonly accepted threshold value of 10 (Hair et al., 2006) and suggests that 
multicollinearity is not a problem in our data.  
 
Results 
 
Our purpose is to test the likelihood and stock-price related outcomes of 
organizations engaging in open strategy through corporate voluntary communications 
targeted at financial analysts and their investors undergoing M&A. Our analysis 
therefore proceeds as follows. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and correlations. 
In Table 2 we display the results of two regressions: In Models 1a, 2a, 3a, and 4a we 
carry out a logistic regression analysis in which the dependent variable is the 
probability of a given organization carrying out voluntary M&A announcements. In 
Models 1b, 2b, 3b, and 4b we carry out a regression analysis which has a dependent 
variable in the form of cumulative abnormal returns associated with voluntary M&A 
announcements. In both cases our two independent variables are strategic variation 
and strategic deviation. Our control variables comprise of contexts or circumstances 
associated with information asymmetry.  
Insert Table 1 and Table 2 
Table 2 provides the stepwise logistic regression analysis. Models 1(a-b) and 
2(a-b) consider the impact of our independent variables on the likelihood of 
organizations engaging in open strategy individually: only one of our independent 
variables is associated with the likelihood of disclosure. The subsequent models (3(a-
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b) and 4(a-b)) introduce successively the combined effects of independent and control 
variables. For the logistic regression analysis, six control variables are significant in 
our final regression model. These are financial advisors in the bulge bracket, deal 
size, prior firm performance, the fact that the deal was rumoured, prior acquisitions 
outside of main industry, and share price reactions associated with initial 
announcements of the deal. Our control variables’ significance levels vary between 
p<0.001 and p<0.10 for estimating the likelihood of organizations engaging in open 
strategy. Model 4a drops non-significant control variables. Our final model for the 
logistic regression analysis is significant at p<0.005.  
For calculating market reactions associated with open strategy, we find that 
financial advisors, share price reactions associated with initial deal announcements, 
and changes in analysts’ estimates are significant control variables (p<0.1 for all 
variables). The final model for estimating CAR associated with voluntary M&A 
announcements is significant at p<0.01.  
We start with hypothesis 1a, which states that the probability of observing 
voluntary M&A announcements is higher for organizations that display greater 
strategic variation compared to organizations that display lower strategic variation. 
Model 4a in Table 2 indicates that for organizations whose strategy is associated with 
a shift over time, the likelihood of having an open M&A strategy is no different to 
those that do not have changes taking place regarding their strategy (coefficient: 0.05; 
p>0.1; standard error (SE): 0.00). However, in testing for hypothesis 1b, we find in 
Model 4a that having a strategy that is characterised with having a deviation from 
industry norms increases the likelihood that organizations will engage in external 
transparency (coefficient: 1.41; p<0.005; SE: 0.00). This suggests that strategies that 
vary over time do not encourage organizations to be transparent towards analysts and 
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investors during M&A but a deviation from industry norms does increase the 
likelihood that they will. We therefore find support for hypothesis 1b but not for 1a. 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b test for the above-average share price reactions 
associated with voluntary M&A announcements for organizations whose strategies 
are characterised with strategic variation and strategic deviation. Model 4b displays 
the results for these tests: we find that CAR associated with open strategy practices 
for organizations that are moving away from their existing strategy as a result of the 
M&A deal is significant at p<0.1 (coefficient = 0.02; SE: 0.00). For organizations that 
are deviating from existing industry norms, CAR is significant at p<0.05 (coefficient 
= 0.04; SE: 0.00). At the mean of our sample, this consists of $453 million in market 
capitalization. We therefore find weak support for hypothesis 2a and moderately 
strong support for hypothesis 2b. Comparing these findings with findings for our first 
set of hypothesis, especially H1a warrants attention. While strategic variation is not a 
factor that increases the likelihood of organizations engaging in open strategy, it is 
associated with above-average share price reactions. The reason why investors react 
to voluntary disclosures of organizations that are undergoing strategic variation is 
partly due to the fact that there is likely to be less uncertainty surrounding these deals 
compared to deals that are associated with deviation. More importantly, however, we 
venture to suggest that the reason why investors may be reacting in ways that they do 
is due to organizations’ reluctance to communicate publicly. Therefore, for 
organizations that do engage in open strategy, share price reactions are likely to be 
significant, and above all, they are likely to be favourable. 
Regarding effect sizes, we calculated Cohen’s d (the standardized mean 
difference). Our effect size calculations for our independent and control variables in 
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models 4a and 4b vary between 1.82 and 0.98 indicating strong or moderate effects 
(Cohen, 1988).  
 
Discussion 
 
M&A are substantial and hard to reverse strategic commitments involving 
great financial investment and considerable managerial and organizational resources 
(Angwin, 2007). However purchasing a specific firm may be associated with share 
price penalties and between announcing and closing a deal many things may go 
wrong (Angwin et al., 2015). For the companies involved an important question arises 
as to whether, and to what extent they ought to engage in acquisition related 
communications to investors in order to persuade them to back the deal (Angwin et al. 
2014). In other words to what extent is external transparency as an aspect of open 
strategy beneficial to protagonists?   
In this paper we argue that increasing external transparency through 
acquisition announcements can help inform investor decisions in order for M&As to 
proceed. With the exception of a very few papers (for example, Loree et al., 2000), 
research into M&A has so far overlooked post-announcement voluntary corporate 
communications. These acquisition announcements are forms of openness in strategy 
that can increase transparency by reducing information asymmetry between outside 
investors and internal managers. While there is existing research on M&A that 
focuses on information asymmetry between these two parties, it focuses on reactions 
of investors to acquisition announcements (see for example, Cuypers et al., 2016; 
Ragozzino and Reuer, 2007; 2009; 2011; Reuer et al., 2012) rather than 
announcements following the announcement of the deal. We believe that by shedding 
light onto voluntary acquisition announcements following the initial mandatory bid 
communication, we are not only addressing an important gap in terms of how 
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investors evaluate strategy talk (Whittington et al., 2012) but also how organizations 
can actively manage their M&A process.  
In investigating why organizations engage in open strategy, we find that 
organizations whose M&A strategy deviates from the industry are more likely to 
engage in voluntary acquisition announcements. In being open about their M&A 
strategy organizational leaders may be reacting to the fear that analysts may 
downgrade their stock due to their own cognitive limitations or evaluative 
uncertainty. Communicating intention can act as a powerful signal for investors 
particularly as the firm and management stand to lose something, such as reputation, 
should the promise not work out (Besanko et al., 2004). The reduction in uncertainty 
attendant on reducing information asymmetries increases the willingness of 
shareholders to pay more for the company's stock (Bassen et al, 2010; Healy and 
Palepu, 2001).  
We also find that there is little difference in the occurrence of M&A 
announcements between firms with high and low strategic variation. This suggests 
that senior management feel much less need to issue voluntary M&A announcements 
when the deal in question is a variation in firm resource deployment but not different 
from resource deployments across the industry. This suggests that investors are less 
sensitive to the history of firm resource deployment than whether a firm is departing 
from industry norms. The message therefore is that when a firm is likely to stand out 
from the crowd in its M&A, it needs to engage in more openness in strategy in order 
to reduce investor uncertainty. There may also be an argument to say that even when 
an M&A will cause a firm to vary its resource deployment in a way that departs from 
past practice, it may be better for management not to alert investors to this variation, 
taking the view that investors are likely to compare the deal against an industry 
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‘benchmark’. Being outwardly transparent then may be wise when departing from 
what stakeholders are familiar with, namely industry norms, and perhaps not desirable 
when conforming to industry norms, as this might trigger suspicions.  
Our analysis also includes further tests to determine whether specific open 
strategy practices are associated with significant share price reactions. Our test results 
convey that both strategic variation and deviation are associated with above-average 
cumulative abnormal returns in favor of strategic deviation. The reason why strategic 
deviation is likely to cause stronger reactions may be due to the easing of investors’ 
and analysts’ initial nervousness regarding unfamiliar strategies. While analysts, in 
particular, are characterized by their narrow specializations, organizations venturing 
away from industry norms (i.e. deviating) are likely to cause analysts to downgrade or 
give modest ratings for these companies. Investors follow analysts’ recommendations 
and are likely to have reflected the modest estimates in their purchasing choices. A 
voluntary disclosure which follows an unusual strategic move therefore might serve to 
ease the minds of analysts and investors in terms of how organizations defend their 
strategic choices, how they will implement the changes that the M&A deal requires 
and furthermore, inject credibility regarding their capability for change.  
Our research is not without limitations: first, we focus only on the U.S. market 
but organizations that undertake cross-border M&A deals are also likely to engage in 
open strategy. Also, the likelihood of disclosure may be higher for organizations that 
experience negative share price reactions to their initial announcements of 
acquisitions announcements and therefore these voluntary disclosures may act as 
attempts to adjust market reactions. Furthermore, our research focuses on external 
transparency as an orchestrated and proactive practice carried out by organizations to 
alter external stakeholders’ perceptions. There may, however, be circumstances in 
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which outside stakeholders or constituents can be influential in altering strategy 
outside of organizational leaders’ intended forms of involvement. Recent longitudinal 
qualitative research by Ferraro and Beunza (2014) shows shareholder dialogue can 
lead to corporate change where activist analysts in corporate investor meetings may 
be powerful influencers of strategy and other corporate issues.  
We also acknowledge various limitations of our independent variables, 
strategic variation and strategic deviation. It is difficult to establish whether 
organizations undergo strategic variation and deviation as a result of the acquisitions 
under question. While the acquisition may have contributed to strategic variation or 
deviation, the extent to which it has done so remains to be explored. Also, our 
understanding of strategic variation and deviation is limited to the products and 
product lines within the Compustat Segments database (which MergerMarket 
employs). As identified by Litov et al. (2012), if these industry codes aggregate 
various product lines, then understanding the full extent of how a given organization’s 
strategy varies in comparison to the industry norm or from its former strategy may not 
be captured fully. Future research can make use of these variables for determining 
more long-term associations with the diffusion of open strategy. While our research 
focuses on when organizations employ open strategy practices as ways to react to 
events, researchers can delve into further questions such as when and why 
organizations adopt more openness in strategy.  
Conclusion 
 
Our research sheds light on circumstances in which organizations demonstrate 
increased transparency towards their outside stakeholders during M&A. We show that 
the likelihood of organizations engaging in external transparency is high for those that 
have strategies that depart from industry norms but not for those that have strategies 
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moving away from their own norms. The reasoning behind this is likely to be tied to 
organizational leaders’ efforts to escape potential or existing share price penalties. 
These unfavorable outcomes may be driven by analysts who cannot understand an 
organization’s strategy due to their own cognitive limitations – tending to assess 
organizational strategy in relation to industry norms rather than in terms of whether it 
departs from a company’s prior trajectory. While both strategic variation and strategic 
deviation are forms of strategic change, we have undertaken a careful analysis of 
share price reaction which suggests that one is seen as a circumstance that 
organizations associate with analyst evaluative uncertainty while the other is not. Our 
findings suggest that organizational leaders are aware that more openness in strategy 
is necessary when departing from industry norms, against which they are being 
judged, and also that this openness might not be desirable, even when the organization 
is departing from past behavior as long as it is within industry parameters. In this 
sense, our findings suggest that more openness in strategy is not always a positive 
force for organizations and therefore enhances the idea that strategic openness is 
‘uneven and incomplete’ (Whittington et al., 2011) in different settings. We also 
provide a more nuanced understanding on how organizations in different strategic 
settings put the transparency aspect of open strategy into practice.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
  Means Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 Voluntary M&A announcements 1.82 0.43 1         
          
2 Strategic variation -0.97 -0.54 0.13 1        
          
3 Strategic deviation 0.86 0.38 0.37 0.21 1       
          
4 Legal advisors in the magic circle 0.73 0.19 -0.01 0.03 0.08 1      
          
5 
Financial advisors in the bulge 
bracket 
0.89 0.23 0.19 0.05 0.09 0.17 1     
          
6 Consultants – white shoe 0.94 0.15 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.13 0.11 1    
          
7 After 2008 0.64 0.27 -0.27 0.09 -0.05 0.02 0.03 0.02 1   
          
8 Deal size ($MM ln) 3.22 0.31 0.11 0.23 0.19 0.10 0.09 0.18 0.07 1  
          
9 Prior firm performance 0.11 0.21 0.13 0.19 0.23 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.09 0.07 1 
          
10 
Time from initial announcement 
to closing of the deal 
91 35 0.17 0.26 0.33 0.01 0.05 0.09 -0.00 0.13 0.03 1          
11 Rumoured 0.42 0.18 -0.29 0.22 0.35 -0.09 0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.34 0.05 -0.07 1         
12 Acquisition volume (t-1) 3.23 1.43 0.04 0.16 0.21 0.08 0.11 0.17 -0.29 0.08 0.17 0.01 0.05 1        
13 Acquisition volume (t-3) 11.44 3.26 0.15 0.23 0.44 0.10 0.13 0.18 -0.18 0.10 0.09 0.03 0.11 0.23 1       
14 Acquisition volume (t-5) 19.21 5.91 0.20 0.47 0.63 0.14 0.19 0.22 -0.09 0.14 0.03 0.00 0.19 0.18 0.37 1      
15 
Acquisitions outside main SIC 
code (t-1) 
1.13 1.05 0.39 0.12 0.22 0.09 0.06 0.05 -0.08 0.07 0.15 -0.19 0.21 0.29 0.17 0.06 1     
16 
Acquisitions outside main SIC 
code (t-3) 
6.73 2.15 0.21 0.20 0.41 0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.12 0.11 -0.31 0.29 0.09 0.18 0.14 0.39 1    
17 
Acquisitions outside main SIC 
code (t-5) 
9.88 3.46 0.10 0.31 0.56 0.06 0.05 0.10 -0.07 0.14 0.03 -0.47 0.57 0.13 0.24 0.31 0.28 0.02 1   
18 
CAR (initial M&A 
announcement) 
0.01 0.00 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.01 1  
19 Change in analysts’ estimates 1.32 0.33 0.29 0.13 0.26 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.00 0.05 0.12 -0.10 0.41 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.09 0.03 0.41 1 
N=472. Correlations above 0.15 are significant at p<0.05. 
Table 2 
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Regression 1(Models 1a, 2a, 3a, 4a): Logistic regression with dependent variable as the probability of observing a given organization carrying out voluntary M&A 
announcements 
Regression 2 (Models 1b, 2b, 3b, 4b): Regression with dependent variable as the cumulative abnormal returns (-1,+1) associated with voluntary M&A announcements 
 
 Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b Model 3a Model 3b Model 4a Model 4b 
Intercept 23.71 (0.18) 0.11 (0.27) 126.41 (0.15) 0.05 (0.08) 132.69 (0.08) 0.07 (0.19) 417.39 (0.13) 0.08 (0.05) 
Main effects (hypotheses)         
Strategic variation associated with M&A deal 0.09 (0.00)  0.03* (0.00)   0.03 (0.00) 0.01† (0.00) 0.05 (0.00) 0.02† (0.00) 
Strategic deviation associated with M&A deal   1.98*** (0.00) 0.05** (0.00) 1.37*** (0.00) 0.03* (0.00) 1.41*** (0.00) 0.04* (0.00) 
Control variables         
Legal advisors in the magic circle  0.09 (0.00) 0.00 (0.04) 0.06 (0.00) 0.00 (0.08) 0.14 (0.00) 0.00 (0.03)   
Financial advisors in the bulge bracket 0.55† (0.00) 0.02* (0.00) 0.61† (0. 00) 0.02† (0.00) 0.70† (0. 00) 0.01† (0.00) 0.72† (0.00) 0.01† (0.00) 
Consultants – white shoe 0.02 (0. 00) 0.00 (0.07) 0.01 (0. 00) 0.00 (0.10) 0.03 (0. 00) 0.00 (0.05)   
After 2008 -0.11 (0. 05) 0.00 (0.12) -0.07 (-0. 03) 0.00 (0.10) -0.18 (-0. 04) 0.00 (0.14)   
Deal size ($MMln) 0.51* (0.03) 0.00 (0.10) 0.60* (0.01) 0.00 (0.06) 0.55* (0.02) 0.00 (0.06) 0.63* (0.00)  
Prior firm performance 0.60† (0. 00) 0.00 (0.04) 0.74† (0. 00) 0.00 (0.11) 0.83* (0.00) 0.00 (0.15) 0.88* (0.00)  
Time from initial announcement to closing of the deal 0.06 (0.03) 0.00 (0.17) 0.04 (0.01) 0.00 (0.21) 0.03 (0.01) 0.00 (0.19)   
Rumoured -1.33† (0.00) 0.00 (0.31) -1.28 (0.00) 0.00 (0.24) -1.98 (0.00) 0.00 (0.21) -2.27* (0.00)  
Acquisition volume (t-1) 0.11 (0.04) 0.00 (0.28) 0.10 (0.05) 0.00 (0.19) 0.09 (0.07) 0.00 (0.14)   
Acquisition volume (t-3) 0.09 (0.03) 0.00 (0.51) 0.06 (0.04) 0.00 (0.47) 0.04 (0.05) 0.00 (0.36)   
Acquisition volume (t-5) 0.05 (0.01) 0.00 (0.09) 0.04 (0.00) 0.00 (0.06) 0.02 (0.00) 0.00 (0.05)   
Acquisitions outside main SIC code (t-1) 1.01* (0.00) 0.00 (0.07) 1.04* (0.00) 0.00 (0.08) 1.12* (0.00) 0.00 (0.11) 1.15* (0.00)  
Acquisitions outside main SIC code (t-3) 0.09 (0.00) 0.00 (0.13) 0.06 (0.00) 0.00 (0.10) 0.05 (0.00) 0.00 (0.09)   
Acquisitions outside main SIC code (t-5) 0.03 (0.00) 0.00 (0.16) 0.04 (0.00) 0.00 (0.13) 0.02 (0.01) 0.00 (0.08)   
CAR (initial M&A announcement) 2.03*** (0.00) 0.01† (0.00) 2.01*** (0.00) 0.01† (0.00) 1.87*** (0.00) 0.01† (0.00) 1.91*** (0.00) 0.02† (0.00) 
Change in analysts’ estimates  0.07 (0.03) 0.02† (0.00) 0.08 (0.04) 0.02† (0.00) 0.05 (0.03) 0.02† (0.00)  0.03† (0.00) 
Observations 472 886 472 886 472 886 472 886 
Chi sq. 29.52* 16.82† 31.57** 19.27† 37.92*** 28.27* 47.18*** 36.49** 
†p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.005; ****p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. All models include year fixed, industry, and order effects
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